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Outside of Mathematics, and perhaps Philosophy, all interesting
inference is uncertain. It is uncertain because it proceeds from
uncertain premises, and the uncertainty of the premises infects
the conclusion, or because it makes use of principles of inference
that are not always truth preserving, or both. Our concern in this
course is primarily with uncertain inference in the latter sense:
with principles of inference that are not always truth preserving.
Our concern is not with MAKING such inferences but with the LOGIC
of such inferences.
One may study such Logic from two points of view: The point of
view of a handbook, which seeks to make various approaches
to this logic understandible while leaving the details to separate
study, and the point of view of a text which seeks to inculcate
facility in the use of a preferred version of the logic.
The book emphasises the approach of a handbook. The lectures will
focus on learning the system of evidential probability.
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